[ Reports & investigation ]

Geographic DMARC maps: explain what location data cannot prove

Treat a map as IP enrichment with uncertainty, not evidence of an attacker location or a business-service owner.

By the EmailAuth research team

[ Key points ]

  • Maps enrich source infrastructure; they do not locate an attacker.
  • Retain enrichment version, plotted unit and unknowns.
  • Use verified business impact and identity evidence to prioritize actions.
On this page

A map can make a DMARC report easy to scan and easy to overinterpret. A colored country may represent infrastructure associated with a source IP, not the location of the person who sent a message. The underlying aggregate report supplies a source address; geography is an additional lookup whose method and date must remain visible.

Identify what the map actually plots

References: RFC 9990 §3.1.1.8.

Ask whether the visualization maps reported source IPs, reporter locations or an analyst's inferred service locations. These are different populations. RFC 9990 describes the source IP in the aggregate record. It does not provide a verified attacker-country field.

MaxMind’s accuracy guidance explains that an IP estimate cannot locate a specific individual or household and may locate a proxy rather than its user. Record the enrichment provider, database edition, lookup time and geographic precision. Keep unknown results as unknown. Do not convert an unavailable location into the headquarters of a hosting provider. If only country-level confidence is supported, a precise city pin creates a misleading impression.

Separate infrastructure from responsibility

Shared hosting, relays and gateways can put many unrelated users behind infrastructure that receives the same geographic label. A message routed through an intermediary can appear from that intermediary's address at the reporting receiver. Infrastructure location is therefore an investigation clue, not proof of account ownership, authorization or sender intent.

A reverse-DNS label or provider name adds another clue, not an ownership certificate for your organization. Confirm a candidate service with account configuration, trusted message evidence and a business owner before classifying its observations as legitimate.

Define the displayed metric

References: RFC 9990 §3.1.1.8, RFC 9990 §3.1.1.4, RFC 9990 §3.5.4.

Choose whether color represents unique IPs, message observations or failing observations. Label it explicitly. Summing aggregate counts produces a different measure from counting map pins. Preserve the report interval, contributing receivers, duplicate-handling rules and unknown-location count beside the display.

If comparing countries, use the same enrichment revision and observation scope. A database update can move addresses between regions without a routing change. A new reporting receiver can change the apparent map without a new campaign. Mark these changes before drawing a trend conclusion.

Work through a geographic alert

Synthetic example: one enriched region has 900 failing observations from a shared cloud range; another has ten failures on a verified payroll route. The map highlights the 900-observation region most strongly. That does not establish 900 attackers there, nor does it make the payroll failure unimportant.

The next actions differ: retain the large unknown stream for attribution and abuse analysis, and test the verified payroll route promptly. Do not add the shared range to SPF because its provider is familiar. Do not block an entire country solely from this map without evaluating actual authorization, handling and business consequences.

Publish the map with a caveat and drill-down

A useful caption says that locations are estimates for reported source infrastructure, specifies the enrichment version and notes that unknowns are retained. Provide a path to the source records, identities, counts and service ownership evidence. Restrict drill-down access when it reveals operational information beyond the intended audience.

Finish each geographic investigation with a supported finding, unresolved attribution and an owner for the next step. If geography contributes nothing to the decision, use a service-level queue instead. A map should help an analyst choose evidence to inspect, not replace that evidence with a confident story about where an attacker lives.

Continue the investigation

Use the aggregate-report walkthrough for the underlying fields and the alignment diagnosis guide when raw authentication success does not satisfy DMARC.

Keep the illustration within its evidence

For the fictional 900-versus-10 comparison, the map supplies no count of people, attackers or confirmed abuse. Preserve the larger unclassified stream while prioritizing the supported payroll investigation. No IP geolocation lookup, geographic block or sender authorization was performed.

[ Takeaway ]

Maps enrich source infrastructure; they do not locate an attacker. Retain enrichment version, plotted unit and unknowns. Use verified business impact and identity evidence to prioritize actions.

[ By role ]

What this means for you

Choose your role for practical next steps.

IT / Mail Admin

Retain raw IPs and enrichment versions.

Separate unique-IP and message metrics. Correlate candidate services with owners.

Next steps

  1. Retain raw IPs and enrichment versions.
  2. Separate unique-IP and message metrics.
  3. Correlate candidate services with owners.

CISO / SecOps

Reject unsupported person attribution.

Keep unknowns and coverage visible. Require evidence before broad blocking changes.

Next steps

  1. Reject unsupported person attribution.
  2. Keep unknowns and coverage visible.
  3. Require evidence before broad blocking changes.

Founder / Non-technical

Prioritize verified business impact.

Ask what each map color counts. Avoid country-based conclusions without evidence.

Next steps

  1. Prioritize verified business impact.
  2. Ask what each map color counts.
  3. Avoid country-based conclusions without evidence.

[ FAQs ]

Frequently asked questions

Does a country pin locate the attacker?

No. It is generally an estimate about infrastructure associated with an IP.

MaxMind geolocation accuracy

Is geography a native DMARC verdict?

No. It is enrichment applied to reported observations.

RFC 9990 §3.1.1.8

Should unknown locations be hidden?

No. Keep their count visible so the display does not imply complete coverage.

Why can a map change without new sending?

Enrichment updates, receiver coverage and display scope can change the result.

MaxMind geolocation accuracy

What does a pin count measure?

Only the chosen pin population, often unique IPs, not necessarily messages or people.

Can provider location prove service ownership?

No. Corroborate with account evidence, message identities and a business owner.

MaxMind geolocation accuracy

Should geography determine SPF authorization?

No. Authorize only verified intended sending infrastructure through the supported configuration.

What belongs in the map caption?

The plotted unit, interval, enrichment version, precision limits and unknown count.

[ Sources ]

Sources

  1. RFC 9990

    Sections §3.1.1.4 · §3.1.1.8 · §3.5.4

  2. MaxMind geolocation accuracy

    Sections Limitations to IP geolocation; variations; accuracy radius; database updates

[ Glossary ]

Glossary

Reported source IP
The connecting source address represented in an aggregate report row; it is not a verified person-location field.

RFC 9990 §3.1.1.8

Enrichment version
The recorded provider/data revision used to derive a geographic label from an IP address.

Enterprise provenance

Why top financial institutions and governments retired their email security dashboards.

Traditional email authentication platforms sell you a dashboard and ask your engineers to do the labour. In high-stakes environments, manual oversight means delayed enforcement, configuration drift and unmonitored shadow domains.

EmailAuth is the agentic email provenance platform. Our agents enforce p=reject, keep third-party senders aligned and move your domains to full RFC 9989 compliance, the new DMARC standard,, with human-in-the-loop auditability.

Governments Large enterprises Tier-1 financial institutions

SaaS · Dedicated tenancy · Air-gapped on-prem · BYOK encryption

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